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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GUNNISON VALLEY BANK, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 860200 
DARWIN and GWEN JENSEN, 
husband and wife, CHARLES 
F. YOUNG and DOROTHY YOUNG, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Was the verdict form utilized by the jury clear 
and unambiguous and, if it was not, was any error waived by 
Plaintiff? 
2. Did the lower court commit error in dismissing 
Plaintiff's claim of fraudulent conveyance as a matter of 
law and in failing to allow Plaintiff to reopen its case; 
and, if so, was such error harmless? 
3. Did the lower court commit error in directing a 
verdict as to Plaintiff's claim of a lost mortgage and, if 
so, was such error harmless? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by the plaintiff seeking to 
foreclose on the residence of Defendants located in Gunnison, 
Utah. In addition, Plaintiff claimed that Darwin and Gwen 
Jensen had fraudulently conveyed title to their residence to 
defendants Charles F. Young and Dorothy Young. Plaintiff 
sought an order of the court allowing foreclosure on the 
alleged mortgage as well as setting aside the alleged fraudu-
lent conveyance. (R. 106-110) . 
Defendants Darwin and Gwen Jensen denied that any 
mortgage had been executed as to their personal residence 
and denied that any fraudulent conveyance had been made. 
In addition, as affirmative defenses, they claimed that 
Plaintiff had breached a fiduciary duty to them by encouraging 
them to purchase a business in which the bank officers had a 
personal financial interest. They also claimed that the terms 
of the business had been materially misrepresented. In 
addition, Defendants counterclaimed against the Plaintiff 
claiming that a trust relationship existed between the defen-
dants and the officers of the bank,- that material misrepresen-
tations were made concerning the sale of a service station-
convenience store by the officers, that any note or mortgage 
given was obtained by fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, and 
that Defendants suffered both general and punitive damages as 
a result of the bank officers1 conduct. (R. 128-136). 
A jury trial commenced on February 13, 1986 with the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs presiding. At the conclusion of 
Plaintiff's case the Court directed a verdict against the 
plaintiff as to the question of whether a mortgage had been 
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executed in conjunction with a promissory note for $21,000. 
The Court also dismissed the question of fraudulent conveyance 
as a matter of law. (Tr. 217). The Court refused to reopen 
the case as to the claim of fraudulent conveyance. (Tr. 216). 
Additional witnesses testified on behalf of Defendants. 
At the conclusion of the trial the Court met with counsel 
concerning the jury instructions and general verdict forms. 
Mo objections were made by either counsel as to the jury 
instructions or the verdict form. (Tr. 413). Three separate 
verdict forms were submitted to the jury. Verdict No. 3 was 
utilized by the jury (R. 170) and subsequently a judgment on 
the jury verdict was entered by the lower court. (R. 174-175) . 
The lower court ordered that no recovery be allowed against the 
defendants on the promissory note of $21,000 and that in addi-
tion Defendants be awarded $13,500 against Plaintiff together 
with their costs. (R. 174-175). It is from this Judgment 
that the present appeal is taken. (R. 179-180) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in Appellantfs Brief 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-7) is totally inadequate. The 
Statement concentrates solely upon the execution of the 
promissory note and alleged mortgage and completely fails 
to state the general background of this case and the circum-
stances giving rise to Defendants1 Counterclaim. For these 
reasons, therefore, Defendants shall submit their own version 
of the Statement of Facts and shall, under the Rules of 
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Appellate Review, recite all evidence favorable to the lower 
court's decision and verdict. 
Defendant Darwin Jensen testified that in 1960 he lived 
in Centerfield, Utah with his family. He started working 
part-time jobs for farmers and opened an account with the 
Gunnison Valley Bank when he was twelve years old. (Tr. 325). 
In 19 70 he went into military service and upon leaving entered 
construction work. While working near Fillmore in 19 72 he 
suffered an industrial accident in which he lost both of his 
arms. Shortly before the accident he had married Gwen Jensen. 
(Tr. 220). He completed two years of college at Snow College 
and attended two quarters at Utah State University. (Tr. 
369-370) . 
Events Surrounding the First Deposit of $250,000 
In October of 19 79 he was notified by his attorney that 
a Federal Circuit Court had affirmed a decision in which he 
was awarded damages as a result of his industrial accident. 
Upon learning that he was to receive $300,000 he immediately 
went to Mr. Keith Anderson, who was the vice president of 
Gunnison Valley Bank. (Tr. 326). Mr. Anderson had been with 
the bank for forty years and had known Darwin and his wife 
Gwen all of their lives. He was also acquainted with Darwin's 
father, Burns, who had been doing business with the Bank since 
1960. (Tr. 71, 344). 
Upon going to the bank, Darwin stated that he asked Mr. 
Anderson whether the money should be deposited with the Gunnison 
bank or put in a larger bank in Salt Lake City. Anderson, 
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according to Jensen's testimony, replied that the Gunnison 
Valley Bank could easily handle that amount of money and would 
make arrangements for him and help him with his money. He 
stated that Anderson said he would advise him and watch over 
the money and give him advice as to how to manage it. (Tr. 
326). Gwen Jensen verified this conversation and added that 
she told Mr. Anderson that they had never had this kind of 
money before and did not know what to do with it. Mr. Anderson 
said that there would be no problem and that he would help 
them handle their money. (Tr. 220). 
Both Darwin and Gwen stated that when he made these repre-
sentations they believed him and trusted him, since they had 
dealt with this bank all their lives and had confidence in 
Anderson's desire to help them. (Tr. 221, 329-330). 
In the first part of October of 1979 Gwen and Darwin 
deposited $299,000 with the plaintiff Gunnison Valley Bank. 
After talking with Mr. Anderson, they decided that a 90-day 
certificate of deposit would be the best course of action 
for the money initially. Accordingly, a certificate was 
taken out for $250,000 at 11.625% interest. (Tr. 105-106). 
The remaining $49,000 went into a checking account to pay 
off existing obligations. (Tr. 373). 
Darwin and Gwen decided to move back to Gunnison and 
began looking for a home. After they found a house that looked 
reasonable they discussed the price with the owners and with 
Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson told them that it seemed like a 
good investment and that the price of the home was right. 
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The home cost $35,000. In January Darwin withdrew $50,000 
from the account in order to purchase the home and put the 
remaining $200,000 in a second CD certificate at 13.25% for 
180 days. (Tr. 330, 375, 136). 
Later, when additional money was needed to remodel the 
home, Darwin was told by Mr. Anderson that it would be better 
to obtain a loan from the bank and to use the certificates of 
deposit as collateral rather than invading them and losing the 
interest. (Tr. 331). Between January of 1980 and July of 1980 
some $74,000 in loans was given to Darwin and Gwen using the 
CD's as collateral. (Ex. 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14; Tr. 152). 
When the $200,000 certificate of deposit expired, Darwin and 
Gwen paid off the loan to the bank and took out another CD 
for $120,000. (Tr. 154). 
It is unnecessary for this appeal to go through the 
various financial dealings which occurred between 19 80 and 
19 81. Darwin testified that he discussed with Mr. Anderson 
on numerous occasions the feasibility of putting money into 
a small motel-bar which his father had renovated and into 
a small hog farm operation. (Tr. 333-344). As a result of 
these various conversations Darwin continued to take out 
loans from the bank to invest in these ventures and to bail 
out his father, who was in financial trouble because of them. 
On one particular occasion, for example, he testified that Mr. 
Anderson approached him in the lobby of the bank as he was 
making a deposit and told him that his father was having 
problems making his own payments on the motel and perhaps 
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he should start making his father's payments for him. After 
discussing this with his father and Mr. Anderson, he started 
making payments on the previous loans taken by his father. 
(Tr. 341-342). 
Mr. Anderson stated that during this period the bank 
made next to nothing on the money which was kept in the savings 
certificates (Tr. 397) , since it was only able to make 1/8th 
of one percent on that money. On the other hand, the bank was 
making 2% for every dollar that was borrowed, based upon the 
certificates of deposit as collateral. (Tr. 149). 
During this entire period Mr. Anderson did not seem 
concerned about the rapid expenditure of Darwinfs funds and 
encouraged him to invest in his father's businesses, which 
had already been financed by the bank, and in new businesses • 
where loans were taken out. (Tr. 345-350). 
By August of 19 81 all of the money obtained from the 
lawsuit had been spent and none was available in the bank 
account. Darwin testified that this loss of funds nearly 
destroyed his self-esteem and sense of worth, and that he 
learned that he was not capable of handling money, which had 
a devastating effect upon his ego. (Tr. 367). 
The Purchase of the Husky Station 
In the winter of 1980, while there were still funds in 
the bank, Darwin was approached one day as he was transacting 
business at the teller window by Paul Anderson, who is the 
son of Keith Anderson and is also Assistant Vice President and 
Loan Officer of the plaintiff bank. (Tr. 350, 165). Paul 
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Anderson told Darwin that he and Steven Buchanan, another 
officer of the bank, had bought a Husky service station-
convenience store and that they were interested in selling it. 
They told him it would be a good business for him and that he 
should consider investing in it. Darwin told them that he 
would think about it. (Tr. 351) . Gwen Jensen remembered 
this conversation also. (Tr. 239). 
In the spring of 1981 Paul Anderson again approached 
Gwen and Darwin while they were at the bank. Paul Anderson 
stated that he still had the Husky business for sale and 
that he felt it would be a good move for Darwin and Gwen to 
buy it, since they would be able to work there with no problem. 
They again told him that they would think about it. (Tr. 240, 
351) . 
In August of 1981 all of the $250,000 was gone from the 
bank. Neither Darwin nor Gwen was employed. Darwin could 
not find a job and the bills were beginning to pile up. Darwin 
and Gwen talked it over and decided that the Husky convenience 
store might be the answer to their financial problems. (Tr. 
242) . 
Accordingly, Darwin went to Paul Anderson's office and 
asked him if the business was still for sale. Anderson told 
him that the business had good potential and had been making 
a lot of money, and that Darwin and Gwen should be able to make 
a go of it. This first conversation occurred in June or July 
of 1981. (Tr. 352). 
In August of 1981 Darwin had a second conversation with 
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Paul and Steve. He asked if he could see the books of the 
business and review them so that he could get a feel for the 
business. They told him the books weren't available, but would 
be made available to him shortly. In the meantime, they told him 
the business was paying all of their overhead and wages plus 
furnishing them both with approximately $300 each of goods and 
services that they took out of the business each month. (Tr. 353). 
He then asked them about the inventory of the store and 
they told him that it had "impulse" kinds of things like 
candy bars and automobile inventory, but that it had a good 
solid inventory of merchandise, had a good sales record, and 
everything was current and of good quality. He testified that 
he had no reason to doubt either of these bank officials, 
since he had dealt with them at the bank for years and had 
gone to school with them when he was younger. (Tr. 355). 
Paul Anderson testified to a more gloomy conversation. 
He stated that, while the store was paying its way, it was not 
making much money. He said, however, that since he was paying 
$1,000 in wages a month, Gwen and Darwin would be able to 
make at least that much if they did the labor themselves. He 
denied telling Darwin and his wife about taking $300 a month 
out in groceries and gas and also could not remember if he 
told Darwin about the condition of the inventory. (Tr. 191). 
He acknowledged that in his deposition he testified 
that the winter of 1980 was a bad one and that the station 
was losing money on every gallon of gas that was pumped. 
Darwin was not told this, however. He also admitted that 
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all the conversations regarding the Husky station occurred 
inside the bank and that Darwin and his wife trusted him as 
to the advice he was giving them. (Tr. 190). 
Steve Buchanan admitted he had said in his deposition 
that the business at the time of sale was showing a loss over 
two years and this was without giving a value to the two hours 
of time that he and Mr. Anderson had to put into the store 
each day. He recalled that they told Darwin and his wife 
that they could easily clear $1,000 a month if they provided 
their own labor in the operation. (Tr. 20 2-204) . 
Harold Jensen, a certified public accountant, testified 
that he had prepared the tax returns for the Gunnison Valley 
Husky from 1979 through 19 82. He stated that, while the first 
year of operation of Anderson-Buchanan showed a profit of 
$4,600, the next two years showed a loss of $6,900 and $13,688. 
(Tr. 278). In his opinion, the opening of a new competing 
store called the Double Quick Store was an event which affected 
the profitability of the Gunnison Husky station. (Tr. 279). 
The Double Quick station began operation during the winter of 
1980 . (Tr. 117) . . 
Paul Anderson and Steve Buchanan had purchased the 
business for $26,500. (Tr. 181). The value of the equipment 
when sold to Anderson and Buchanan was $14,500. 
After several more discussions it was decided that 
Darwin would buy the business from Anderson and Buchanan 
for $16,500. The equipment was valued at $10,000 (Tr. 201)' 
and the inventory at $6,500. (Tr. 268). 
-10-
In order for Darwin to purchase the Husky service station, 
it was necessary that he take out a new loan from the bank. 
At the time of the loan the papers described in Appellant's 
Statement of Facts and contained in Appellant's Appendix were 
prepared. A promissory note for $21,000 was signed by Gwen 
and Darwin Jensen. There is. no question that the Jensens 
received $21,000 from the bank at that time and applied this 
money to the purchase of the station. It was disputed, however, 
whether or not a mortgage had been executed at the time of the 
other documents.. Mr. Anderson testified that a mortgage was 
prepared on the residence and was given to Darwin to take to 
the title insurance company for recording. The bank maintained 
copies of all the loan documents except the mortgage. Mr. 
Anderson testified that only an original of the mortgage was 
prepared and that was given to Darwin. (Tr. 76, 88). The 
Jensens denied that any mortgage on their residence was ever 
executed. 
The Operation of the Husky Station 
After taking possession of the service station and 
store, Gwen and Darwin immediately took an inventory of the 
items in the store. (Tr. 243). After taking this inventory, 
Darwin went back to Mr. Buchanan and told him that he thought 
he paid too much for the inventory considering what was in 
it. Mr. Buchanan said that they had already ordered and paid 
for a $500 shipment of other items and that would make up any 
deficiency. The $500 worth of items never arrived. (Tr. 355). 
Darwin testified that he later discovered that the 
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inventory was actually appraised at 100% over its true value. 
He stated that the jewelry that was left was not saleable 
and had essentially no value at all. The tapes were either 
old or unpopular and would not sell. At least half of the 
grocery items were out of date or unsaleable. He estimated 
the market value of the inventory to be closer to $3,500. 
(Tr. 358-359) . Likewise, he discovered that the equipment 
was largely out of date or not functional. He estimated 
that its value was approximately $3,000, as opposed to the 
$10,000 that he paid for it. (Tr. 360). 
Darwin stated that he assumed that he and his wife could 
look forward to an income of around $1,500 a month if they 
performed their own labor, based upon the representations of 
Anderson and Buchanan. (Tr. 361) . They both stated that for 
the first several months during the hunting and fishing seasons, 
sales were good, but not of the magnitude they had expected. 
(Tr. 244, 361). Darwin obtained another job at a dairy and 
began to work at both jobs between 5:00 in the morning and 
10:00 at night. His wife worked between eight and ten hours 
a day and also took care of the family. (Tr. 363). 
As winter approached and the hunting season ended, the 
sales dropped to almost nothing since only local customers 
continued to buy gas and none of the inventory inside the 
store was sold. (Tr. 362). During this time Gwenfs blood 
pressure started to go up and she began failing in health. 
As the business continued to go downhill more and more pressure 
was put on both of them, until she had to go into the hospital. 
(Tr. 362). 
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Towards the middle of 1982, when Gwen was having con-
siderable medical problems, Darwin decided he needed to 
expand the business and hire help. He went to the bank to 
talk to Paul Anderson about refinancing or bringing part of 
the bills together under one roof and getting operating 
capital. Paul and the other officers told him that they did 
not make those kinds of loans. (Tr. 363). 
In August of 1982 Gwen stated that she had gone in to 
pay a partial payment to the bank and Mr. Keith Anderson 
said that if she did not have a full payment not to bother 
paying anything. She stated this was very embarrassing to 
her and this was the final blow. In September of 1982 they 
closed the doors of the station. At that point they were 
behind on their gasoline payments and on their rent payment. 
(Tr. 264-247) . 
Juan Larson had been the owner of the store prior to 
Anderson and Buchanan. He stated that after the Jensens took 
over the store it was not in as good condition as when the 
six employees were running it for Anderson and Buchanan. 
He characterized the store as a high-maintenance type of 
building which required a lot of upkeep. (Tr. 161). He 
readily acknowledged it. would be much more difficult for a 
man who had no arms to keep a high-level maintenance building 
functioning than someone who had normal functions. (Tr. 165). 
Mr. Anderson stated that even though Darwin was in 
default under the terms of the promissory note, he did not 
check to see if a mortgage was recorded until March of 1983. 
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It was then that he discovered that no record of the mortgage 
existed. (Tr. 124). Subsequently, this lawsuit was 
commenced in April of 1983, seeking enforcement of the 
promissory note and foreclosure on the missing mortgage. 
(R. 1-6) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant has claimed three errors in its Brief: 
(1) that the lower court erred in directing a verdict as to 
the question of the existence of a mortgage; (2) that the 
lower court erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
there was no fraudulent conveyance and in failing to reopen 
the case to introduce the deed; and (3) in entering a judgment 
on a jury verdict form which was incorrect. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 7-9). 
Respondents believe that these arguments should be addressed 
in reverse. If the jury verdict was correct and in fact the 
plaintiff now owes the defendants $13,000 on the counterclaim, 
then the questions concerning validity of the mortgage and the 
fraudulent conveyance are moot and become harmless errors. 
Argument, therefore, will be presented in reverse order. 
First, the verdict of the jury was proper and the 
entry of that verdict as a judgment was also proper. A 
conference was held with the attorneys for both parties 
concerning the jury instructions and the verdict forms. No 
objections were entered by either. The jury was given three 
distinct verdict forms from which to choose. The first one 
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would have awarded the plaintiff a judgment for the entire 
sum of the note plus interest with no award being made to 
Defendants. The second would have awarded the plaintiff the 
entire sum of the note with an offset being awarded to 
Defendants. The third denied the plaintiff any recovery on 
the note, and in fact assessed damages against it based upon 
Defendants1 Counterclaim. It was this third verdict form 
which the jury chose to utilize, and the plaintiff cannot now 
claim error simply because the jury decided to award Defendants 
damages which were in excess of the amount Defendants owed to 
the plaintiff pursuant to the promissory note. 
Second, the lower court properly dismissed the claim as 
to the fraudulent conveyance and properly refused to reopen 
the case. Plaintiff failed to prove any of the essential 
elements required in a fraudulent conveyance case during their 
case in chief, and the mere introduction of the deed between 
the Jensens and the Youngs would not have established sufficient 
evidence even if the lower court had allowed that deed to be 
introduced. The lower court exercised its discretion in 
electing not to allow the plaintiff to introduce additional 
evidence regarding the alleged fraudulent conveyance when it 
had ample opportunity to develop its case but failed to do so. 
Finally, the question of the missing mortgage was also 
properly directed by the lower court. Plaintiff had not 
sought an action in equity seeking the declaration of the 
mortgage, as is required. Instead, Plaintiff initiated an 
action of foreclosure based upon a mortgage which it could 
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not prove existed. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to 
bring an independent action rather than to bootstrap the 
question of the deed's validity into a foreclosure action 
and attempt to use rules of evidence relating to best evidence 
and secondary evidence. 
In any event, as noted earlier, the question regarding 
the alleged fraudulent conveyance and the existence of the 
mortgage is of no relevance at this point, since the jury found 
that the defendants did not owe the plaintiff bank any money 
and therefore the bank can neither foreclose on a mortgage 
(assuming it exists) nor complain about a fraudulent con-
veyance (assuming that all the elements are met). 
These arguments will now be examined. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT RETURNED BY THE JURY WAS 
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCABLE AND, TO THE 
EXTENT IT WAS NOT, SUCH ERROR WAS 
WAIVED BY PLAINTIFF . 
As noted by the appellant, Instruction No. 8 informed 
the jury about the amount owing and the claims of the parties. 
It said: 
You are instructed that defendants Darwin 
Jensen and Gwen Jensen admit that they signed a 
note in favor of the Gunnison Valley Bank in the 
amount of $21,000, with interest at the rate of 
16% per annum. Plaintiff Gunnison Valley Bank 
claims that defendants Darwin and Gwen Jensen owe 
it $19,902.94 together with $11,405.76 interest 
to and including February 18, 1986, for a total 
of $13,308.70. 
Defendants Darwin and Gwen Jensen, while 
admitting they signed the note and received the 
money initially, claim that they do not owe the 
said bank the full amount because of repayments 
and offsets. (Tr. 413-414). 
The jury was given three verdict forms from which they 
could choose to return their verdict. Form 1 (R. 172) found 
the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendants "on the promissory note in the sum of $19,902.94 
together with interest as provided by the note." This form 
obviously would have been used by the jury had they concluded 
that the defendants had no valid counterclaim and that there 
was no offset available to the defendants as to the amount 
of the note. 
Verdict No. 2 provided that the jury found that Darwin 
and Gwen Jensen had executed a promissory note in the sum of 
$21,000 together with interest, but that they were entitled 
to an offset against the said note, .and,the balance due "the 
Plaintiff Bank, if any, is the sum of $ , as of 
this date." (R. 173). This verdict would have been used by 
the jury had they believed that the defendants were entitled 
to receive credit for certain offsets urged by them, such as 
the offer to make partial payment to the bank or the waiver 
of interest during portions of the time because of the bank's 
conduct. This verdict form was therefore designed to give 
Plaintiff complete relief on the note less any offset the 
jury found the defendants were entitled to receive. 
The third verdict form, and the one ultimately used by 
the jury, states: 
We the jurors in the above-entitled action, 
find for defendants Darwin Jensen and Gwen Jensen 
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after taking into consideration the Promissory Note 
a balance of: 
1. Damages sustained in connection with the 
Gunnison Husky business, if any, in the sum of 
($3,500) . 
2. Damages from loss of deposit in Gunnison 
Valley Bank, if any, in the sum of ($ ). 
Darwin Jensen: 
3. General damages for emotional distress, 
if any $ — . 
4. Punitive damages, if any, ($5,000). 
Gwen Jensen: 
5. General damages, for emotional distress, 
if any $ — . 
6. Punitive damages, if any ($5,000). (R. 170). 
Appellant contends that it failed by inadvertence to 
include a line on the instruction which would once again allow 
the jury to fill in the amount owing to it on the note, and 
therefore, before the $13,500 can be assessed against it, it 
is necessary to offset this award with the amount of the 
principal and the interest on the note. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 19-20) . 
The argument of Appellant ignores the clear language of 
the instruction. It informs the jury to "take into considera-
tion the promissory note" which includes the undisputed 
principal and interest as instructed in Instruction No. 8 
and referred to in the other two verdict forms. It then 
refers to the term "balance" and asks the jury to proceed 
at that point. It is fundamental that the term "balance" 
means "the amount still owed after a partial settlement or 
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whatever is left over; remainder." Webster's New World 
Dictionary, 2 Ed. (1980). This verdict form clearly told the 
jury that if they found damages in excess of the amount 
owing on the promissory note they were to fill in these 
various blanks, which would be the balance owing to the 
Jensens by the bank. In other words, this verdict form 
only was activated when the jury was convinced that the 
Jensens1 damages on their counterclaim were in excess of the 
claim of the plaintiff in its initial complaint. 
It is interesting to note that the appellant has quoted 
this Court's decision of Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 
664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983) to support its argument. In that 
case the sole question before the court was whether the award 
of punitive damages was proper, since two distinct theories 
of recovery, one in contract and one in tort, had been sub-
mitted to the jury. Under the breach of contract claim puni-
tive damages would not be proper, while under the misrepre-
sentation tort claim punitive damages would be allowed. There 
was no question in that case concerning the language contained 
in the verdict form itself. This Court stated, "General 
verdicts are to be construed with a view to sustaining the 
verdict and effectuating the intention of the jury if possible." 
664 P.2d at 1164. Thus, the Cook case actually supports the 
position of Defendants that the verdict form should be read 
consistently with the intention of the jury to award damages 
to the defendants on their counterclaim in excess of the amount 
claimed by the plaintiff in its Complaint. See also, Bennion 
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v. LeGrand Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1.078 (Utah 1985) 
where this Court noted a similar rule in reconciling jury 
interrogatories and special verdict forms. 
The record is clear that no objection to this jury form 
was ever made either before it was submitted to the jury or 
after the verdict was returned. It was not until the form 
of the judgment was submitted to the lower court that any 
question was raised. Even here no formal motion was ever 
made by the plaintiff for relief, and the only effort made 
by Plaintiff is contained in a letter to the judge together 
with a proposed judgment form of the version Plaintiff claims 
to be correct. These documents are not even included as 
part of the official court file, but are merely attached to 
the cover of the file as correspondence. Even so, the lower 
court rejected Plaintiff's proposed judgment form and 
signed the judgment submitted by Defendants. (R. 174-175). 
It is fundamental that, in the absence of timely objection 
to the form or to the answers of a verdict, any error is 
waived by the complaining party on appeal. Smith v. Schreeve, 
551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976). A party cannot allow a jury to be 
excused without requesting correction of an error and then 
claim an irregularity on appeal. Lish v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 493 P.2d 611 (Utah 1972). 
In Nagle v. Conger, 456 P.2d 411 (Ariz. App. 1969) the 
parents of a child injured by a city garbage truck complained 
on appeal that the verdict form submitted to the jury did not 
make a distinction between the parents as plaintiffs and the 
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child as plaintiff and requested the appellate court to 
reverse the verdict. The court held that since the parents 
had failed to utilize the opportunity in submitting their 
own form of verdict to the court and had further failed to 
object to the form of the verdict submitted, they had waived 
any claimed error in the language of the verdict form. This 
same scenario applies to the instant case. 
Finally, while it is true, as Appellant notes, that 
Rule 51 allows an appellate court in certain instances to 
review jury intructions even when no objections are made, such 
discretion is very limited. This Court in E. A. Strout Western 
Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320 
(Utah 1983) noted that while an appellate court in its discretion 
and in the interest of justice may review the giving or failure 
to give an instruction, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved 
party to present a persuasive reason to invoke such discretion. 
Here, there were certainly no circumstances involved which 
would excuse the failure to object to the form of the verdict 
or to object to the verdict's return while the jury was still 
impaneled. 
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court was correct 
in entering its judgment based upon the verdict finding that 
the obligation of Defendants to Plaintiff upon the promis-
sory note had been extinguished and, in addition, that the 
plaintiff bank owed the defendants $13,500 for its wrongful 
conduct. 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW AND IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
PLAINTIFF TO REOPEN ITS CASE AND IF ANY 
ERROR WAS COMMITTED, IT WAS HARMLESS. 
Appellnat has contended that the lower court should not 
have found in favor of the defendants as a matter of law 
relating to the fraudulent conveyance claim and should have 
allowed the appellant the opportunity to reopen its case. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-19). This argument must fail for 
the following reasons: (1) since the jury found that Defen-
dants did not owe Plaintiff any money on the promissory note, 
Plaintiff cannot claim the status of a creditor and cannot 
complain as to any disbursal of assets by the defendants; 
(2) the plaintiff substantially failed to prove elements 
necessary for a fraudulent conveyance case and the lower court 
was correct in dismissing it; (3) the lower court did not 
abuse its discretion in failing to reopen. These contentions 
will now be addressed in serium. 
In order to have standing to assert a fraudulent con-
veyance claim it is essential that the complaining party be 
a creditor of the defendant who is claimed to have fraudulently 
conveyed property. Even if it is assumed for purposes of 
argument that the lower court erred in dismissing this claim 
or in failing to reopen Plaintiff's case, such error at most 
was harmless. Before a judgment can be reversed there must 
be a showing of a reasonable likelihood of a different result. 
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Assn., 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 
-22-
1977); Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d. 217 (Utah 
1983). 
Even if the jury had concluded that a fraudulent convey-
ance did occur it would make no difference to the result of 
this case, since Plaintiff would still be precluded from 
asserting an interest in the family residence because it was 
determined by the jury that any debt between the defendants -' 
and the plaintiff had been extinguished by the claims asserted 
in Defendants1 Counterclaim. 
Numerous cases hold that error as to an issue in a 
trial which ultimately has no effect on the outcome of the case 
is harmless and does not justify reversal of the remainder of 
the judgment. In Short v. Day, 708 E.2d 488 (Colo. App. .1985) 
the court there ruled that the failure to conduct a hearing 
on a vendor's application for payment from a real estate 
recovery fund was harmless error where the vendor was not 
entitled to recovery under any circumstances. 
In Way v. Hayes, 513 P.2d 1222 (Nev. 1973)the Supreme 
Court of Nevada held that where the jury had returned a verdict 
for the defendant without reaching the question of damages, 
it was harmless error to permit a defense witness who had not 
been named as a witness in response to interrogatories to 
testify on the question of damages. 
In Payne v. McDonald, 528 P.2d 552 (Ore. 1974) a jury 
made a special finding that a motorist who was turning into 
her driveway when she struck the plaintiff motorcyclist was 
not guilty of negligence in any of the particulars alleged 
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by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that 
this finding established conclusively the motorist's non-
responsibility for the accident and any alleged error con-
cerning contributory negligence of the motorcyclist was 
rendered harmless by the jury's special findings. 
Applying this principle, since there is no debt owing 
because of the verdict returned by the jury, the claims of 
Plaintiff relating to the fraudulent conveyance and to the 
mortgage, to be discussed infra, have become moot and any 
errors relating to the conduct of the lower court becomes 
harmless and not subject to reversal. 
Even if it were assumed arguendo that this issue is still 
ripe for adjudication, the actions of the lower court were 
correct. This Court in Furniture Manufacturers Sales, Inc. 
v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398 (Utah 1984) held that in order to 
prove a claim of fraudulent conveyance it is incumbent upon 
the plaintiff to show by clear and convincing evidence (1) 
that plaintiff is a creditor of the defendant; (2) that the 
defendant is insolvent or would become insolvent by reason of 
the conveyance, and (3) that the conveyance was made without 
fair consideration. A review of Plaintiff's evidence as 
seen at the conclusion of its case (Tr. 1-206) shows that the 
plaintiff completely failed in showing the second and third 
elements of the cause of action and, as a matter of law, the 
lower court properly dismissed the claim. 
This was not a case, as asserted by Appellant, where 
merely introducing the deed of conveyance between the Jensens 
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and the Youngs would establish the elements necessary for 
their claim. Rather, it is a case where extensive testimony 
would have had to be elicited to establish both the financial 
conditions of the Jensens at the time of the conveyance as 
well as the particulars of the arrangement between the Jensens 
and the Youngs. No doubt oral as well as documentary evidence 
would have had to have been submitted regarding both of these 
elements. 
The right to reopen a case after a party has rested is 
vested in the discretion of the lower court. In Tangaro v. 
Marrento, 373 P.2d 390 (Utah 1962) this Court affirmed the 
lower court's refusal to reopen a case to permit a party to 
introduce additional evidence when the party had listed the 
claim in the pretrial order and had every opportunity to 
present evidence respecting that claim during the presenta-
tion of its case. After a party rests its case without 
proving the facts necessary to support a claim, the trial 
court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen 
the case and take additional evidence. In re Marriage of 
Jackson, 534 P.2d 644 (Colo. App. 1975). 
For these reasons, therefore, the question now raised 
by the appellant is moot and any error is harmless, the lower 
court was correct in concluding that the appellant had not 
met the elements necessary in its case, and did not abuse its 
discretion in failing to reopen Plaintiff's case. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIRECTING 
A VERDICT AS TO APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF A 
LOST MORTGAGE AND, EVEN IF IT DID, SUCH 
ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
For the same reasons discussed previously in Point II 
of this Brief, any failure of the lower court to address the 
mortgage question is harmless error. It is fundamental that 
in order for a mortgage or trust deed to be foreclosed a 
legal debt or obligation with a specific amount owing must 
be established. Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 
19 83). Since the jury concluded that any amount owing to 
Plaintiff on the promissory note was eliminated and that in 
fact Plaintiff now owes Defendants damages for its tortious 
conduct, the existence or non-existence of a mortgage is 
immaterial. Obviously, Plaintiff cannot foreclose on a 
mortgage if there is no underlying debt upon which the 
mortgage is based. 
Even if it is assumed arguendo that a viable controversy 
still exists regarding this argument, the lower court was 
nevertheless correct in its ruling. Respondents do not disagree 
with the authorities cited by Appellant in its Brief concerning 
lost documents. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-17). The rules 
of evidence clearly allow a party to utilize secondary evidence 
in proving the terms of a document which has been lost or 
destroyed. These authorities allow such evidence at the 
discretion of the lower court to be introduced when the 
various rules have been satisfied for their introduction. 
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In the cases cited by Appellant no claim was made as to the 
original existence of the document, but merely as to its 
whereabouts. In the Scott case cited by Appellant, for 
example, (Appellant's Brief, p. 13) this Court in an early 
decision noted that it would be proper to prove a lost and 
unrecorded deed through parole evidence after the parties 
to the transaction were dead and after the lapse of many 
years without anyone complaining or claiming any interest 
in the property. Likewise, in the Bingham Livery & Transfer 
case and in the Nelson case, all decided by this Court at 
the turn of the century, no claim was ever made that the 
document did not exist. 
None of the cases relied upon by Plaintiff involved an 
action in which the instrument which is claimed to be lost 
is the subject of the lawsuit and in which a claim is 
asserted by the opposing party that the document was never 
executed. Here, the question of the mortgage was not a 
collateral issue of evidence to prove a portion of Plaintiff's 
case, but was in fact the sole basis of Plaintiff's First 
Cause of Action. Plaintiff was seeking a foreclosure in 
equity of the mortgage interest. 
In these types of situations, where the document itself 
is the basis of a claim, it is incumbent upon a party to 
bring a separate suit in equity seeking a declaration of the 
existence of the document. See 52 Am. Jur.2d, Lost and 
Destroyed Instruments, §29; 54 C.J.S., Lost Instruments, §11. 
An action to foreclose a mortgage is equitable and is not 
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properly before a jury in any event. An action to declare 
the existence of a document required for foreclosure is also 
equitable and requires a declaration by the court that the 
claimed instrument did in fact exist and is entitled to 
enforcement. 
The pleadings in this case are barren of any request by 
the plaintiff to declare the existence of the mortgage. 
Rather, the pleadings assume the mortgage exists and is in 
the custody of the defendants. (R. 2, 108). Nearly two 
years prior to trial Plaintiff was put on notice that Defendants 
were denying the existence of a mortgage. (R. 9 3-94) . No 
effort was made to amend the pleadings to put the existence 
of the mortgage at issue, or to seek an independent adjudication. 
The lower court, after listening to the evidence presented, 
correctly decided that this was not a jury question and ruled 
in favor of the defendants. To have allowed the issue to 
proceed otherwise would have been beyond the scope of the 
pleadings and would have clearly violated the requirement of 
a separate equitable proceeding to determine the existence 
of the document. 
In summary, since there is no underlying debt now owing 
to the plaintiff by the defendants, the question of the existence 
or non-existence of the mortgage is moot. Any error committed 
regarding the mortgage issue is harmless. Defendants deny 
that any error occurred in that the plaintiff failed to 
seek the correct relief in a claim of a missing mortgage 
where enforcement is sought. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial in this court consumed nearly two days of 
testimony. It remained basically undisputed that the 
underlying basis for the note upon which Plaintiff's Complaint 
is based concerns the business transaction of bank employees 
with the defendants. The jury had ample evidence to conclude 
that this fiduciary self-dealing was improper and that the 
claims made by the bank officers to the defendants were 
false, causing Defendants to suffer severe financial loss 
as well as mental and emotional strain. 
The verdict forms submitted by the parties allowed the 
jury three alternatives in their decision. Either Plaintiff 
recovered everything and Defendants nothing, Plaintiff and 
Defendants recovered something, or Plaintiff recovered nothing 
and Defendants recovered on their Counterclaim. Because the 
jury chose the last option does not now give the plaintiff 
the right to appeal the form of the verdict. The language 
contained in the verdict form is clear and unequivocable. 
In addition, any alleged error in the wording of the form 
or in the return of the verdict by the jury has been waived 
by the conspicuous silence of Plaintiff in the lower court 
proceeding. 
Because no debt has been found to exist by the jury, 
the question as to the alleged fraudulent conveyance and 
mortgage are now moot. Even if errors were committed regarding 
these two issues, such errors are harmless and do not justify 
reversal since these issues have no effect upon the outcome 
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of the case. 
For these reasons, therefore, the judgment of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
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